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Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt 




Harsh arguments accompanied the development and the history of the Suez canal 
company either among nationalist Egyptians (just before, during or just after the 
nationalisation of the canal in 1956) or among some historians dedicated to find out 
clues of imperialist powers on key tools and moves of world economy. Whilst some 
historians (D. Landes, S. Saul, C. Niquet) denounced the financial tutelage exerted by the 
Suez company on Egypt, a commonplace opinion reproached the Company to have 
neglected the basic investment to modernize the Suez canal and had accused it of 
enlivening privileged incomes without managing a broad engineering project to allow the 
canal to reach standards of modern shipping. 
Our paper will scrutinise the evolution of the canal after its inception and 
emerging period, at its apex. It will gauge the financial figures of the investment moves of 
the company, the equipment of the canal management in Port-Saïd, Ismaïlia and Suez 
Port, the actual evolution of the canal ability to face transit constraints, and the technical 
level reached by the piloting entity. It will also raise the question of the Egyptianisation 
of the staff but will not consider the question of the contribution of the canal 
developments to Egypt’s development, which will take place elsewhere. Such a paper will 
be intimately linked to maritime history as it will study a key water-way of international 
maritime roads and ponder the relationship between the evolution of shipping and transit 
on one side and the equipment and modernisation of the Suez canal on the other side. Its 
long-range scope will avoid a too much restrained case study and help consider far-
reaching debates and conclusions. 
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The nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 – symbolized by the toppling of 
Ferdinand the Lesseps’ statue which had been erected in 1899 – marked a watershed in the 
fight against Occidental imperialism in the Middle East and the emerging third world.
1 Apart 
from geopolitical considerations, the fight against the Compagnie internationale du canal 
maritime de Suez (“Suez Maritime Canal International Company”) was often justified by its 
Egyptian detractors on technical grounds such as the accusation that it was becoming 
increasingly more complacent and losing its entrepreneurial spirit resulting in a decline in the 
investments required for modernizing the canal. This in turn meant that it could not cope with 
the development and changes in the traffic through the Isthmus of Suez during the first half of 
the 20th century. In fact, throughout its  history, the Company was dogged by numerous 
controversies. David Landes
2 turned the Company into an imperialist economic tool used as a 
financial lever in Egypt. During the years 1875-1884 it found itself imbroiled in debates 
regarding British influence in Egypt.
3 Later, it became a symbol of the radiating influence of 
imperial France. It was hotly contested over in the two World Wars and even the Ottomans 
made a grab for it in 1915. Finally, in the early 1950s, its future lay in the debates regarding 
certain pockets of foreign influence in Egypt.
4 
The Company itself always wanted to remain “neutral”, away from all controversies regarding 
nationalism or imperialism. It just wanted to be a “service company” which would aid in the 
development of the isthmus, help meet the needs of the world maritime and commercial 
community and contribute in opening up the economies on the other side of the canal. 
Endowed with a unique statute, it enjoyed the advantages of being registered as an Egyptian 
company in France and as a French company in Egypt. Though this ambivalence undoubtedly 
served its financial and fiscal interests, it also permitted it to be a kind of international 
organization mainly at the serice of shipowners, shippers and maritime freight forwarders. 
Our work here is not to exonerate the Company, but rather to understand how its investment 
strategy adapted itself to the quantitative and qualitative change in the traffic and how the 
technology (in terms of draught, width, capacity of the canal, transit times, etc.) responded to 
the demand. For that, we need to look at the threesome: money-navigation-investment. An 
over-investment would have resulted in hiked tariffs and blunted the company’s profits. An 
under-investment on the other hand would hamper traffic and thus reduce receipts and 
dividends. As for any corporation, it was a question of the optimum allocation of resources 
and the perennial dilemma regarding the profitability of an investment, that is to say, at what 
point would an additional investment lead to a significant increase in the income and in profits 
(the famous return on investment) or, on the contrary, lock up funds for years in the form of 
new equipment which fail to increase the income sufficiently. 
It must also be noted that, from the legal standpoint, the Company benefited from a 
“concession” granted by the Egyptian government in 1857 – provided of course, that it abided 
by its clauses. On one hand it had to consider the growth in traffic and undertake the 
                                                 
1  Cf. George Edgar-Bonnet, Ferdinand de Lesseps. Le diplomate, le créateur de Suez, Paris, Plon, 1951.   
Ferdinand de Lesseps. Après Suez, le pionnier de Panama, Paris, Plon, 1959. 
22 David Landes, Banquiers et pachas. Finance internationale et impérialisme économique en Égypte, Paris, 
Albin Michel, 1993 (published in English since 1958). 
3 Samir Saul, La France et l’Égypte de 1882 à 1914. Intérêts économiques et implications politiques, Paris, 
Committee for the economic and financial history of France, 1997. 
4 Cf. Hubert Bonin, Suez, du canal à la finance, 1857-1987, Paris, Économica Publishings, 1987. Our book was 
based mainly on the archives preserved at the Headquarters of the Company. Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt the canal equipment to transit shipping ? 
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necessary maintenance and modernization works, failing which the contract would be 
nullified – if at all we can imagine that a government so dependent on the British could ever 
take such a step – and on the other, it was made clear right from the start of the 1950s that the 
Company would keep in mind the date of concession, fixed for 1968, at which point it would 
return the Canal in a proper working order. It was in this latter clause that, as the investments 
in the “major works” required at least half a dozen years to plan and implement, technological 
and financial considerations came together in a volatile mix. 
I. The situation of the canal at the beginning of the 20th 
century  
The first decades of the history of the Suez Canal were marked by incertitudes regarding the 
success of such a venture. In fact, in spite of the huge advantage offered in terms of 
navigation times
5, the expected increase in traffic was delayed because the Great Depression 
of 1880-1890 brought to a virtual halt all investment in steamships and sailboats (mainly 
clippers) continued to ply the oceans. Moreover, technical glitches surfaced and cast a shadow 
on the safety of the transit through the canal. The company thus faced great financial 
problems as the income barely rose. 
The ship-owners also protested against the delays which plagued the opening of the canal and 
finally, in the early 1880s, British corporations rose in revolt against the Company and 
serendipitously discovered their informal clout in the world maritime community. They went 
on to form a pressure group (that of “shipping” and also the trio of ship-owners, shippers and 
freight forwarders) which could mobilize entire governments and the major financial 
institutions of the world. The rise of British influence in Egypt (military occupation in 1882, 
High Commissioner Cromer in 1883 to 1907, a protectorate in December 1918) and on the 
Company itself (the buying out of its Egyptian shares by British interest groups) reduced 
considerably the leeway given to its directors.  
The Company had to enter into negotiations with these ship-owners in November 1883 and 
accept seven of them into its board of directors which then counted 10 Englishmen out of a 
total of 32. The first result was a regular lowering of the transit toll which dropped by a total 
of 38.5% between 1884-1885 and 1913-1918. Next, a series of works was launched in 1884-
1885. It was the second such program after the original excavations and the efforts to solve 
the still persisting “black points”. Thanks to these efforts at widening and deepening of the 
Canal, ships could now cross without having to slow down or be subjected to yawing due to 
hydro-dynamic forces. The depth attained 8.5 meters in 1890 and then 9 meters. The draught 
went from 7.8 meters in 1890 to 8 meters in 1901. The average width went up from 22 to 37 
meters in 1898. Certain sections attained widths of 65 meters with bends going up to 75-80 
meters. The “stations” were enlarged to facilitate the transit of larger ships. The embankments 
were fortified by plantations and stone pitching. 
This program of some hundreds of millions of Francs was nevertheless spread over time 
(sixteen years instead of seven) as technological advances allowed the Company to improve 
the navigating conditions by means other than dredging. Nighttime navigation was introduced 
                                                 
5 In 1900, the journey from London to Calcutta required between 32 and 69 days covering some 11,686 km via 
the Cape and only between 22 and 47 days (8,109 km) passing through Suez. Similarly, going from Marseille to 
Saigon via the Cape required between 33 and 71 days (11,989 km) while it took only between 20 and 42 days 
(7,168 km) through Suez. Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt the canal equipment to transit shipping ? 
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in 1886-1887, the number of experienced pilots increased and telephony was pioneered. The 
engineering philosophy of the Company took shape in this decade (1880-1890) and it set upon 
a methodical and non-spectacular series of small improvements whose modesty or triviality 
was at odds with what could have been a vast and radical transformation. A quiet, systematic 
program of modernization supplanted the glamour and excitement of a growth based on 
massive investments. 
2. A strategy to match the growth in transit (1900-1940) 
The modest changes in the transit, the embankments and the canal stood in stark contrast to 
the rapid transformation during the first third of the 20th century. The canal finally came into 
its own and made a mark on the world economic map when the countries of the Indian ocean, 
the far East and Oceania began to figure prominently in the “North-South” trade flow. 
A. The growth of the clientele 
At the turn of the 20th century, the structure of world shipping changed considerably. 
Clippers gave way to steamers which took full advantage of the stocks of coal at all the ports 
of call, for example at Port-Said (where the French corporation Worms
6 had its store). Next 
came ships which ran on fuel oil – the first went through Suez in 1908 – followed by ships 
powered by diesel engines (first through Suez in 1912). And soon the entire world shipping 
fleet had been modernized. In 1930, a fifth of the tonnage passing through Suez was 
transported by diesel driven vessels. The growing world economy and the development of 
overseas empires benefitted greatly from this technological advance. Transits through Suez 
went up exponentially. Between 1895 and 1900, some 3,400 to 3,500 vessels had passed 
through annually. That figure passed 6000 in 1928-1929. In 1880-1889 some eight ships 
negotiated the canal on a daily basis, in 1900-1919 it was 11 and in 1920-1929 it went up to 
14 – this in spite of the slowdown caused by the war, the loss of Germany’s colonies and the 
recession of 1920-1921. Globally, the traffic quadrupled between 1900 and 1930 and in spite 
of the crisis in the 1930s, it stabilized at around 30 million tonnes before the War. 
Table 1. Net annual tonnage passing through the Canal (millions of tonnes) 
1892-1897  8  1922  20.7 
1900  10.8  1922-1925  23.8 
1904  13.4  1925  26.8 
1907  14.7  1927-1929  31.4 
1909-1912  17.5  1929 (new record)  33.5 
1910  16.6  1930  31.7 
1912 (pre-War record)  20.3  1932  28.3 
1914  19.4  1935  32.8 
1917  8.4  1937 (new record)  36.5 
1918  9.3  1939  29.6 
1920  17.6    
This growth in the transit
7 can be explained by the extension of the links between Europe and 
the overseas countries. While the Indian peninsula dominated the trade links, the Far East also 
played a part, as did Oceania and East Africa. Understandably, due to its crude oil, the Middle 
                                                 
6 Cf. Irène Bénilan, Le journal de la compagnie navale Worms, 1882-1982, Paris, PEP Publishings, 1982. 
7 Cf. André Siegfried,”Les échanges de marchandises par le canal”, in Suez, Panama et les routes maritimes 
mondiales, Paris, Armand Colin, 1948. Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt the canal equipment to transit shipping ? 
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East too figured prominently in the 1930s (from 2% of transits in 1913 to 24.8% in 1938). 
South to North trade dominated the flow and accounted for two thirds of transits in 1910-1930 
as well as in 1935-1937. Cotton, cereals (Indian and Australian wheat, rice), cane sugar, 
groundnuts, copra, soya, oilseeds, etc. were sent to Europe as were rubber, jute and Indian 
hemp and manganese. Later, Indonesian and Middle-Eastern crude too joined the list.
8 
Table 2. The traffic passing through Suez by geographic point of origin in 1902-1912 
China, Indochina, Japan  23 
East India (Calcutta)  22 
West India (Bombay)  20 
Pacific islands  12.4 
Oceania 9.1 
East Africa and nearby islands  3.5 
Table 3. The traffic passing through Suez by geographic point of origin in 1937 
India, Burma (Myanmar), 
Ceylon 
24.4 
China, Japan, Philippines   20.4 
East Africa and nearby islands  6.9 
Oceania 6.5 
The U.S. Pacific coast   1.2 
Ports in the Red Sea and Gulf of 
Aden 
7.6 
Ports in the Persian Gulf  16.6 
The maritime influence on the economy of the Canal was exerted by a number of large 
corporations, mainly British. In 1901, 22 of the first 37 shipping companies using the Canal 
were English including the Peninsular & Oriental (1
st), Océan SN (3
rd), Clan-Line (7
th), 
Samuel (Shell Line, 9
th) and Harrison (10
th). Five German (Nordeutsche Lloyd, 2
nd ; Hansa, 
4
th ; Hamburg Amerika Linie, 6
th) and the lone Austrian (Lloyd Austrian, 8
th) came before the 
three French (Messageries maritimes
9, 5
th) and two Dutch companies. The British domination 
continued throughout the inter-War period and 1929 saw 28 of the best 55 clients of the Suez 
Company originating from England. 
Table 4. The tonnage of British shipping passing through the Suez Canal 
1890  78 
1901-1910  67.3 
1920  61.7 
1930-1933  55 
1935  48 
1938  50 
1939  51.4 
                                                 
8 In 1909, Persia acquired the Anglo-Persian which had its own fleet, British Tanker. Cf. J.H. Bamberg, The 
history of the British Petroleum company. Volume 2. The Anglo-Iranian years, 1928-1954, Cambridge 
University Press, 1994. Stephen Howarth, A century in oil. The “Shell” transport and trading company, 1897-
1997, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997. Some 5 million tonnes of oil passed through Suez in 1934 against 
the 800,000 tonnes in 1920. 
9.Cf. Marie-France Berneron-Couvenhes, “The internationalisation of Messageries maritimes steamship 
company fom 1851 to 1914: the defense of the French flag overseas”, in H. Bonin (& alii, eds), Transnational 
Companies, 19th-20th centuries, Paris, P.L.A.G.E  Publishings, 2002. Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt the canal equipment to transit shipping ? 
  - 7 - 
Imperialism can explain some of the changes in the transit nationalities: while Italy gained 
importance with its conquest of Ethiopia, Germany lost ground after losing its African 
colonies. Thanks to the development of its Indonesian interests, The Netherlands too gained 
while, despite its empire, France was overtaken by Japan. Paradoxically, though France was 
represented on its board of directors
10 (most often in the name of its three largest shipping 
corporations:  Messageries maritimes, Chargeurs réunis and Havraise péninsulaire), the 
French carried little weight in the power games being played out between the Company’s 
shipping partners.   






Italy  1.4 9.1 4.7 6.6  18.5  14.4 
Germany  15.6  10.7   8.2 7 
Netherlands 4.7  8.1  10.5  7.1  8.3 
France  6  4.4  6.3  5 to 7  5.4  5.5 
Norway 0.6  1  3    4.2  4.3 
Japan  1.6  9.1  3  3 to 5  2.5  1.8 
United States       2.1    1.6  1.5 
B. The technological pressure exerted on the Company 
Now that the Canal had assumed a major and essential role in the economic trading of the 
world, ship-owners began to equip themselves with larger and larger ships, both in power as 
well as tonnage. The Company thus found itself faced by the technological challenge of 
accommodating a growing number of large vessels with draughts greater than eight meters 
(warships, liners, livestock transporters, etc.). The sign of things to come were already visible 
before the First World War with 213 such large ships (5.6% of the clientele) in 1908 and 374 
(7%) in 1912. 
Table 6. Tonnage of steamships passing through the Canal 
4,000  44 % of 
the total 
1913 
5,000   1880s 




Appearance of the 14,000 to 16,000 in the 
1910s 
16,949  Empress of 
Russia 
1912 











                                                 
10 André Lebon represented the maritime express on the Board in 1906-1938, just as Georges Philippar did in 
1939-1958. Pierre Mirabaud represented the united shippers in 1905-1909. Jules Charles-Roux, who was a 
director since 1889, became the president of the General Transatlantic Company in 1904. Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt the canal equipment to transit shipping ? 
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Table 7. Average gross tonnage of all vessels passing through the Canal 
3,500  1890-1899 
4,500  1900-1909 
5,300  1910-1919 
6,900  1920-1929 
7,700  1930-1939 
C. The technological response by the Company’s engineers 
To keep abreast of these requirements, the Company had set up a pool of some two dozen 
engineers (graduates of the École centrale de Paris, the École des Arts & Métiers, the École 
Polytechnique), draughtsmen and “conductors”, technicians who operated from three bases 
and who were each responsible for an entire sector of the Canal – at Port-Said, Ismailia and 
Port-Thewfik. All working under a Chief Engineer (such as Louis Perrier, a  graduate from 
the École polytechnique and the École des Ponts-&-Chaussées – and thus a high intellectual – 
who held the post from 1902 to 1918 and Paul Solente from 1920 to 1936). They took 
advantage of the large knowledge-base that had been gathered over the decades and especially 
during the third works program (1884-1900). This whole team was supervised by an 
international works consulting committee composed of fifteen experts from diverse countries 
who met every year to evaluate the progress made by the Canal to adapt itself to the demands 
of world shipping. 
During the first third of the 20th century, the Company continued along the lines it had laid 
out for itself during the previous two decades, i.e., to find the optimal balance between 
investing freely in a major modernization program and investing just enough to consolidate 
and thus avoid any excess spending while at the same time to adapt itself sufficiently to the 
quantitative and technological changes in the ships. Three new work programs for 
modernizing the canal were thus implemented in one after another
11 in a kind “flowing plan”. 
They were themselves modified to suit changing circumstances: the “third plan” which was 
conceived in 1901 was upgraded in 1903 and then again in 1906. A fourth program was 
launched in 1908. The fifth, though finalized in 1912, could be implemented only in 1924 due 
to the War. Meanwhile the sixth was launched in 1921. These plans brought about a gradual, 
almost imperceptible improvement in the depth and draught of the Canal. 
Only the sixth program (1921 to 1934/1936) made a clear mark: the width of the Canal was 
standardized at 60 meters (instead of the previous 45 m) and a depth of 10 meters. This was 
possible because the crossing “stations” which had been put in place earlier linked up 
seamlessly. At the bends, the width was increased to 80 meters. And by 1936 the draught 
attained 10.36 meters (34 feet). To summarize: the width of the Canal which measured 37 
meters in 1898 was uniformly widened to 60 meters in the mid-1930s (+38%), the depth 
increased from 9 meters in 1900 to 12 meters in 1934 (+25%) and the draught from 8 to 10.36 
meters (+23%). The most important change were the standardization which greatly facilitated  
navigation, the increased width in the curves and the new crossing stations which could 
accomodate the largest vessels. 
 
                                                 
11 Cf. Christian Funck-Brentano (ed), Compagnie universelle de Suez, Paris, Éditions de Clermont, 1947 (a book 
commissionned by the Company). Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt the canal equipment to transit shipping ? 
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Table 8. Chronology of the works between 1900 and 1940 
 programs  depth  draught  width 
1870       22  meters 
1885-1900 second 
program 
8.5 meters in 
1890,  
then 9 meters 
7.8 meters 
then 8 meters 
in 1901 
width enlarged from 
22 to 37 meters in 
1898; 
some sections of 65 
meters, with 75 to 80 
meters at the bends; 
stone pitching; 
installation of crossing 
stations in  1898 
1901-1907 
(upgraded in 1903 
and again in 1906) 
third program      Increase in the number 
of crossing stations 
1907   10     
1908-1924 fourth  program  11  8.5   
1912        installation of new, 
larger stations in 1912 
1914    12  8.84 (29 feet)  Crossing stations link 
up; 
45 meters (with 10 
meters of depth) 
1912 fifth  program     
1921-1934/1936  Launch of the 
sixth program 
    The stations with the 
new dimensions link 
up: progressive 
unification in width; 
Crossing at two large 
stations at the 22 and 
40 km mark 
1924 Completion  of 
the fifth 
program 
    60 meters between the 
lakes of Amer and 
Suez, in 1925 
1936      10.36 (34 feet)  60 meters achieved in 
1934; 
bends measuring 80 
meters 
A permanent dredging program was initiated to desilt the Canal, as part of the modernization 
works and, in the case of the channel at Port-Said, to clear the sea alluvium. Between 1884 
and 1914, the Canal itself was cleared of some 90 million cubic meters and then of another 50 
million between 1914 and 1939. This total of some 140 million cubic meters represents twice 
the volume of the earth excavated (74 million) when the Canal was first dug through the 
desert. On the average, some 3 to 4 million cubic meters per year were moved between 1900 
and 1925. This number went up to 5 and 6 million between 1927 and 1929. With the number 
of equipment (mainly dredges) increasing, new buildings for their maintenance had to be 
constructed. This equipment, which up till then had been housed on the African side of Port-
Said, was shifted to the Asiatic side between 1907 and 1919. Some hundreds of employees 
(1500 in 1956) too settled there and Port-Fouad saw the creation of a whole township by 
1915-1916. Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt the canal equipment to transit shipping ? 
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D. An easier, faster and more regular crossing 
Now that crossing the isthmus had become rather simple and, more importantly, regular and 
safe, with risk of accidents considerably reduced, the shipowners on the whole were satisfied.. 
The transit times too had been greatly improved and though much of the gain had been 
achieved during the second works program (- 67%), which took some of the shine off the later 
improvements (- 30% between 1900 and 1938), the introduction of nighttime navigation and 
the possibility of handling any ship at any time were major advances achieved in the last 
fifteen years of the 20th century. The shipowners’ satisfaction can also be judged by the fact 
that there were no more claims for damages as there had been in the early 1880s. 
Table 9 : Transit times, in hours 
1885 1888 1890 1895 1900 1905 1938 
43  30 3/4  24  19  18 1/2  18  13 
Only, in the middle of the 1920s they got together with the Canal Company to review the 
required adaptations to the Canal so that it would be able to accommodate still larger ships, 
particularly the oil tankers (“benziniers” as they were called by the Company) which were 
growing both in number and size. In 1928-1931, the team of engineers set about drawing up 
precise plans in order to  increase the draught to 40 feet, otherwise these ships were well 
capable of triggering hydraulic phenomena which would accelerate the erosion of the banks 
and cause even greater technological problems. But then the depression in the world economy 
and the resultant dip in traffic took the urgency off this project: the four large work programs 
accomplished between 1901 and 1934 could comfortably carry the Canal through the 1930s. 
E. A fine balance between investments and benefits 
The initial cost of the Canal is estimated at 433 million francs, of which 300 million went into 
works (such as for the embankment and dredging, etc.)
12. Since the 1880s a total of 518 
million francs had been expended on the subsequent work programs. A different estimate puts 
the total at 366 million francs: with 242 million spent between 1870 and 1914 and another 
124 million between 1914 and 1939. Money-wise, it was as though a second canal had been 
dug and the volume excavated was, as we have seen, double the amount dug out for the 
original canal. 
Table 10. Estimated assets of the Suez Company (in millions of constant francs of 1913) 
Initial cost of the canal  433 
Upgradation work between 1881 and 1939  518 
Cost of the canal in 1939  951 
Value of the Company’s material and equipment 
in 1939 
128 
Value of the Company’s buildings in 1939  80 
Total value of the Canal and the Company’s 
movable and immovable assets 
1 161 
                                                 
12 Let us recall that the cost of the Panama Canal is estimated at 1 400 million francs for the work done between 
1881 and 1921. Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt the canal equipment to transit shipping ? 
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In fact, had there been a need for it, the Company could have easily spent much more as its 
revenues had increased substantially. It had not increased its capital since 1866 and its loans
13 
after 1918. Between 1868 and 1902 its loans amounted to 273 million francs and added up to 
some 150 million francs between 1909 and 1918. Thus, all its investments in works, material, 
constructions and equipment were mostly self-financed. 
The canal was so profitable that its cost was very quickly amortized. The work programs were 
financed with ease and paid back for themselves in a few months by the resultant increase in 
traffic and revenues. In the 1920s, these revenues were supplemented by exceptional 
exchange rates (thanks to the revaluation of the Pound Sterling against the franc, especially 
around 1923 to 1926). And in spite of the devaluation of the Pound in 1931, the 1930s saw 
continued gains in profits because the Company had made many short term investments 
which brought in handsome dividends. 







1875-1914   2  347 
1901-1910 1  134   
1911-1914 533   
1915-1929  1 500  1 032 
1930-1939  2 920  1 376 
1915-1939  4 420  2 407 
Table 12. Estimate of the Suez Company’s money flow (in millions of constant francs of 1913) 
Upgradation work between 1881 and 1939  518 
Value of the Company’s material and equipment 
in 1939 
128 
Value of the Company’s buildings in 1939  80 
Loans between 1909 and 1918  150 
Loans between 1887 and 1902  100 
Liquid assets in treasury in 1939  335 
It is true that the Company made serious efforts at the modernization of the Canal and in 
extending its capacity. But, is it possible that, given the extent of its revenues, the generous 
dividends showered upon its shareholders (which included the British Crown) and its 
financial investments, it could have further reduced its transit tariffs? After the major 
reduction in tariffs (- 38.5% up to 1913-1918) agreed to as a result of an understanding 
arrived at with the ship-owners in 1883, the Company increased them again (+36% between 
1913-1916 to 1918-1920) – pointing at the inflation of the War years and the 1920s and the 
need for financing a new program of works. It is also true that it resorted to loans between 
1915 to 1918. This hike helped in tiding it over the inflation years and the extra revenue 
allowed it not only to continue investing but also reward its shareholders. Still, when the 
situation changed and prices dropped, the ship-owners prevailed on the Company to again 
reduce its rates (in 1930, 1931 and 1934) by a total of 17% between 1929-1930 and 1934-
1935. We would have thought that a still greater reduction would have been easily possible 
                                                 
13 The Company borrowed 100 million francs in 1868, 46 million francs in bonds in 1871-1874, 27 million in 
1878-1882, 100 million in 1887-1902, 30.5 million in 1909-1914 and 119.5 million in 1915-1918. Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt the canal equipment to transit shipping ? 
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given the size of the benefits, the reserves and the percentage of the gross profit distributed as 
dividend (almost two-thirds).
14 
Looking at the other side, we have to admit that the Company did well by giving up taking 
loans and financing itself. It even managed to finance its work programs very comfortably. 
Still, a closer look at the percentage of the receipts distributed as dividend between 1915 and 
1939 (54%) and the proportion of the transit revenues which were turned to dividends (75% in 
1929, 58% in 1939) would seem to indicate that a much larger reduction in the transit fees 
was very much possible. The Company could afford to have its way as it had a clear 
monopoly in the field. The British Crown too found it convenient as two-fifths of the 
dividends (a little more than 44%) went into its own pocket – and that too at the expense of its 
own ship-owners! As the only alternative across the isthmus was by rail or road, the Company 
found itself, with the happy consent of the British Crown, firmly in the driver’s seat. On the 
other hand, could it be that a big reduction in the tariffs would have been more than 
adequately compensated for by a resulting increase in the traffic?  
Table 13. Some financing items of the Suez Company (in millions of current francs) 
  1929 1938 
Transit receipts  1 044  1 660 
Total receipts  1 190  1 784 
Operating expenses for the transit  76  142 
Operating expenses for the 
maintenance of the Canal 
81 158 
Total 157  300 
Loans   83  168 
Provision for upgradation work  80  0 
Amortization of material and 
buildings 
25 50 
Put in reserve  25  15 
Paid to Egypt  0  53 
payments to owners of “civil shares” 
representative of advances to the 
Company; founder’s shares; to the 
administrators and to shareholders 
781 969 
Benefits distributed to employees  15  18 
Percentage of transit receipts 
allocated to other (non personnel) 
benefits 
75 %  58 % 
Three asset items in 1938 




Net profit  915 
 
                                                 
14 As a ruling of 1925 constrained it to pay back its outstanding debts and to pay dividends in their pre-War gold 
equivalent. Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt the canal equipment to transit shipping ? 
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3. The debate over a second canal (1945-1956)? 
Over the years the Company could well imagine that the times followed a classic rhythm: the 
economic crisis slowed the traffic through the Canal, the problem was compounded by the 
War and transits fell by 80% between 1937 and 1942. It was only in 1947 that the pre-War 
(1937) level was regained. On the other hand, during peace times, with the increase in fuel-oil 
driven ships, interest in the Canal grew as it meant a big reduction in refueling stops. 
A. The surge in traffic at the beginning of the 1950s 
The beginning of the 1950s saw a massive increase in the traffic which more than doubled the 
maximum attained at the end of the 1930s. It was the era of the “Korean boom” with the 
Korean War and the rearming of NATO which meant that daily transits doubled between 1947 
and 1951. And then the traffic went further up by another 40% between 1951 and 1956. 
Table 14. Growth in the traffic passing through the Suez Canal 
 






1929  6 274  33.5   
1937  6 635  36.5  17 to 18 
1939  5 277  29.6   
1942  1 646  8.3   
1945  4 206  25.1   
1946  5 057  32.7  14 
1947  5 972  36.6  16 
1948  8 686  55.1  24 
1949  10 430  68.9   
1950  11 751  81.8   
1951  11 694  80.4  32 
1952  12 168  86.1   
1953  12 731  92.9   
1954  13 215  102.5  36 
1
st quarter of 1954     37.13 
1955  14 666  115.8   
1
st quarter of 1956     44 
9 Mach 1958 
   84 
(a record 
till 1975 ) 
Though the mass of the North to South traffic went down a bit as compared to the pre-War 
years, it doubled between 1920-1929 and 1949-1955. In the same period the South-to-North 
transits quadrupled. The petroleum revolution expanded the traffic as the exports from the 
Middle-East were shared equally between the pipelines joining the Mediterranean and the 
Canal. Tankers accounted for 60% of the traffic in 1948 instead of the 17% in 1938 with the 
shippers from the Gulf countries making up 60% of the total instead of the 18% share they 
had in 1935-1939. Moreover, this change also affected the makeup of shipping companies as 
the “flag of convenience” began playing a  major role in Canal traffic. Though the United 
Kingdom still dominated the Company’s clientele, the flags of the Scandinavian countries, 
Panama and Liberia came to occupy prominent positions. Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt the canal equipment to transit shipping ? 
  - 14 - 
Table 15. Growth in the traffic passing through the Suez Canal (in %) 
  1920-1929 1949-1955 
Classified by the major items in the South to North 
traffic 
Minerals and metals  9.4  5.4 
Cereals 17.7  3.4 
Textiles 11.9  3 
Petroleum 15.8  75.4 
Classified by the major items  in the North to 
South traffic 
Metallurgical goods  29.6  17.8 
Intermediate goods    19.7 
cement 4.7  9 
fertilizer 4.2  8.5 
Wood pulp and paper  3  2.8 
Food products    14.6 
sugar 1.3  4.4 
salt 4.9  3 
cereals   7.2 
Energy products    19.7 
coal 7.8  1.3 
Petroleum products  3  18.4 
Table 16. Countries classified according to the weight of the shipping passing through the Suez 
Canal in 1950-1955 
  Percentage of total 
traffic 
Percentage of tanker 
traffic 
1
st. United Kingdom  One third  21 % 
2
nd. Norway  13 to 15 %  17.5 
3
rd. Liberia    17 
4
th. France  9 %  10 
5
th. Italy    8.7 
6
th. Panama    9.5 
7
th. Netherlands     
8
th. Sweden    4 
9
th. United States     
10
th. Denmark     
11
th. Germany     
B. The increase in the size of the ships  
Year after year it had become increasingly more clear that the growth in the traffic is no more 
just a question of extrapolating from the numbers attained in the inter-War years – the surge 
in traffic was such that the Company was hard pressed to think up of ways to adapt the Canal 
to this phenomenon. 
The size of the ships too began to increase. The average gross tonnage went up significantly 
and crossed the 10,000 tonne mark – double the figure attained in 1910-1919 and one-and-a-
half times that of the years between 1940 and 1944. Already in 1955, vessels of more than 
20,000 tonnes constituted almost 5.5% of the total traffic. Very large ships – with either 
lengths exceeding 190 meters or widths of over 26 meters – represented some 6 and 4% Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt the canal equipment to transit shipping ? 
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respectively of all transits in 1955. The number of vessels with draughts of over 30 feet was 
also on the rise and accounted for 5% of the total in 1948 as compared to 1% in 1936-1943. 
The clearance of the Canal could barely accommodate the growing number of ships such as 
aircraft carriers, battleships, whalers, ore tankers and especially the oil tankers for which, a 
draught of 32 to 35 feet had become extremely common in the post-War era. The biggest of 
these ships (such as the aircraft carrier Valley Forge in 1948, or the battleship Richelieu) had 
to take great precautions and slow down markedly while crossing as a clear warning had been 
flashed by the 45,500-tonne Ile-de-France which ran aground on both the occasions that it 
crossed the Canal in 1946. 
Table 17. Growth in the tonnage 







Average tonnage of the oil tankers passing through the Suez Canal 
1953 16,000 
1954 18,000 
It is evident that the trend was towards increasing size with the ship-owners vying with each 
other to manufacture ever larger oil and ore tankers
15. “In 1954 […], we could not have 
foreseen that the number of ships with draughts greater than 36 feet would grow to such an 
extent as to have an impact on the depth of the Canal.” “For a long time to come, the vast 
majority of the ships passing through the Canal would draw less than 34 or 35 feet and the 
shipowners did not feel that the Company needed to spend any money on upgradations which 
would benefit only a tiny minority […]. And then, from 1955, orders flowed in in numbers 
that were unimagined up till then.”
16 “There were almost 700 tankers ordered or actually 
under construction […] of which 12 tipped the scales at over 50,000 tonnes and 195 at 33 to 
50,000 tonnes, against only the 35 in this category which were in service at that time. All 
these ships would be commissioned by 1960 […]. As of today, the largest ship to transit the 
Canal (the Iberia) barely crossed 32,000 gross tonnes and the largest tanker (Tina Onassis) 
31,000 tonnes”
17, which passed through the Canal in December 1953. 
This growth in size caused major problems to the Canal. In 1952-1954, studies on models 
conducted at the Company’s offices in Ismailia and at the hydraulic laboratory at Dauphiné 
(Neyrpic-SOGREAH), in Grenoble, France, indicated that the passage of large ships would 
great increase the erosion of the embankments. The basin of the Canal being too small, these 
large ships would create enormous eddies when they went full steam ahead in order to 
maintain their speed, particularly downstream where they would be subjected to currents. 
These ships would thus hasten the erosion of the embankment below the water-line: “the 
bermes near the riprap have been greatly eroded, while at the same time, the bottom of the 
                                                 
15  Cf. Bernard Cassagnou, Les grandes mutations de la marine marchande française (1945-1995), Paris, 
Publishings of the Committee for the economic & financial history of France, 2002. 
1616 Note by Charles Ribeyre, an engineer of the Suez Company, in 1979, the Suez Company archives. 
17 Note by Charles Ribeyre, an engineer of the Suez Company, 1955-1956, the Suez Company archives. Cf. Paul 
Reymond, Histoire de la navigation dans le canal de Suez, Cairo, French Institute of Oriental Archeology, 1956. 
Paul Reymond was the Company’s Chief Agent at Port-Saïd. Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt the canal equipment to transit shipping ? 
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basin has filled up rapidly. Thus from 1947, dredging operations were required far more 
frequently than before which also meant a corresponding increase in expenses.”
18 
C. Keeping to the original scheme of works  
And yet, at the turn of the 1950s, the Company chose to stick to its original plans, i.e., 
investing in segments as and when the need was felt. Every investment was weighed against 
its marginal cost – even though the theory of marginal cost was not used – so as to keep a 
clear check on the expenses. Due to the War, dredging had to be suspended at Port Said in 
1941 and during the first quarter of 1942 and in the Canal between April 1940 and November 
1943. Thus after the War, an urgent “restoration program” was undertaken by the Company 
with dredging being given the first priority. The embankments were also renovated with 
hundreds of kilometers of ripraps reconstructed between 1945 and 1955. Sheet piles had to be 
driven and the embankments covered with a concrete lining to counteract the erosion caused 
by the backwash of  passing ships. 
The functionality of the Canal was further enhanced with the addition of pilot-boats, tow-
boats and safety-boats (about a hundred in total). The assets increased by 65% between 1936 
and 1956. Additional pilots
19 too were hired and by 1956, their number had grown to 187 of 
which 55 were English and 31 Egyptian. From 1948, the transit was re-organized into 
“convoys”, with ships being grouped at Port Suez and Port Said and made the crossing in 
single file in one direction per day. This avoided the mid-canal crossing of large ships which 
had necessitated that some had to anchor in mid-Canal to let the other pass. This continued till 
1951 when a by-pass channel was opened with fixed zones for crossing. 
A seventh work program was launched between 1948 and 1954 comprising mainly of the 
digging of an 11 kilometer by-pass channel (between Kantara and El Ferdan, from the 49.8 to 
the 61.7 kilometer  mark) which would serve as a crossing zone in addition to the already 
existing one in the Amer Lakes. This “Farouk Diversion” (named after the King) was opened 
in July 1951. Meanwhile, the increase in the dredging improved the depth by half a meter and 
a draught of 35 feet was achieved in March 1955. The Port Said basins too were enlarged. 
Swept forward by this renewed dynamism, a new dredging record was set in 1950 with the 
excavation of 11.582 million cubic meters breaking the old one of 11.252 million which had 
been set in 1908. The by-pass channel itself required the moving of some 14.5 million cubic 
meters. 
D. The technological dilemma faced by the Suez Company 
In spite of all this work (the restoration program followed by the seventh works program), the 
Company began to feel uneasy in the face of the rapidly increasing traffic. “It has been 
already two years [in 1953] that detailed studies have shown that after the completion of the 
seventh works program, the maximal output of the Canal in the most favorable circumstances, 
would not be more than some 40 ships a day on an average. We are already almost at this 
limit as the average number of daily transits in the month of April came to 39.2.”
20 The 
financiers and the engineers of the Company were thus confronted by the problems caused by 
the explosion in the traffic and the difficulties faced by the ships passing through the Canal. 
                                                 
18 Note by the engineers regarding the eigth work program, 1955, the Suez Company archives. 
19 Cf. Captain Parfond, Pilotes de Suez, Paris, France-Empire editions, 1957. 
20 Note on the eigth work program, 1955, the Suez Company archives. Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt the canal equipment to transit shipping ? 
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At the same time, the opening of the Transarabian pipe-line in 1951 brought about the 
distinct possibility of being faced by a competing network. 
Table 18. The explosion in the traffic passing through the Suez Canal in 1955-1956 
  Number of ships  Net tonnage 
(thousands of tonnes) 
  1955 1956 1955 1956 
January  1 193  1 331  9 476  10 551 
February  1 174  1 276  8 950  10 010 
March  1 348  1 397  10 213  10 886 
April  1 249  1 390  9 731  11 193 
May  1 274  1 404  10 015  11 321 
June  1 128  1 324  9 132  10 664 
July  1 182  1 426  9 445  11 673 
August  1 217  1 261  9 606  10 390 
September  1 197  1 183  9 551  9 648 
October  1 255  1 299  10 024  10 670 
November  1  208  9  666  
December  1  241  9  947  
An eighth works program was thus set in motion and spread over five years, between 1955 
and 1960. The idea of a second canal was dropped in favor of a major modernization program 
of the existing Canal. It comprised of adding two by-pass channels: one (of 2.3 km) to the 
south of Port Said which would facilitate the movement of the descending convoys and the 
other, of some 3.7 km, to the south of the Great Amer Lake to shorten the trajectory and 
equalize the transit times between the three sections separated by the two crossing zones. 
Seventy-eight percent of the work was completed by July 1956. The plan also called for the 
widening and deepening of the basin which attained a depth of first 36 and then 37 feet. The 
dredging record set in 1950 was broken in 1955 with the extraction of 11.555 million cubic 
meters. 
E. The strategic dilemma faced by the Suez Company 
At the same time, we must admit that the Company’s enterprising spirit did not falter in any 
way. During the seventh and eighth programs, a total of 54 million cubic meters were moved 
between 1950 and 1955 – more than what had been done in the years 1914 to 1934 and the 
equivalent of two thirds of the 74 million which had been excavated by digging the canal in 
1859 to 1869. The whole canal was widened and deepened while a tenth of the entire length 
(amounting to 17 km) was duplicated. Already in January 1956 the engineers were putting 
together a ninth works program which would create a double passage between Port Said and 
Lake Timsah on one hand, and between the Great Amer Lake  and Port Suez on the other – a 
total of some 105 km, two thirds of the length of the entire Canal. A tenth program would 
then duplicate the central section. 
Technologically the Company still retained its efficiency and this expense was, “materially, 
required, and morally, it attested to our commitment and our tradition of serving the 
international community to the best of our abilities.”
21 It depended much on the increase in 
revenues brought about by the improvements to amortize these works. But, the situation had 
changed completely: the pace of the work needed to be stepped up significantly if the Canal 
                                                 
21 Annual Report of the Suez Company for the year 1955, 12 June 1956. Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt the canal equipment to transit shipping ? 
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was to meet the rapid growth in demand. At this point, the historian would have to note that 
for some reason or the other, there seemed to have been a delay of several months before this 
was realized. It was only in 1955 that the directors seemed to recognize the problem and begin 
to seriously question the objectives set in the eighth works program. 
The rise in the traffic was indisputable as the first five months of 1956 already saw the daily 
transit of some 45 ships. The foundations on which the Company’s engineers had based their 
theories were rudely shaken: “The unexpected jump in 1955 came just as the eighth program 
had got under way. Did that mean that a total revision would be required?”
 22 The Company 
then launched a major enquiry in 1955-1956 aimed at the ship-owners and oil companies with 
a view to get sufficiently reliable data and chalk out the outlines a new program of 
investments in keeping with the projected increase in traffic. The American company Ebasco 
was asked to submit a prospective analysis of its projected requirements up till 1972. Its 
report made it clear that a revolution in maritime transport was underway and that the South 
to North traffic through the Canal would double between 1952 and 1960 and attain some 121 
million tonnes. By the time of the Canal’s concession, it would reach 250 million tonnes and 
in 1972, 330 million. 
Already as things stood, the Canal was close to the saturation point. The delays imposed on 
the larger vessels in their transit, the inconvenience of the routes themselves and the necessary 
creation of “convoys”, were all causes which explain why the transit times did not improve 
anymore. Though it had always required (since 1929) around 11 hours to pass through the 
Canal, it now increased, with the passage from Port Said to Port Suez taking up to 13 ¾ hours 
in 1946-1948 and then to 15 to 15 ¼ hours in 1949 to 1956. It did go back to its 1920 level, 
but that meant the annulment of much of the gains achieved in the 1930s. 
As a result, though no one could have predicted, ex ante, that the world was on the threshold 
of a 20-year economic boom, the Company seemed to be somewhat left behind for several 
months by the rebound of the global economy (after the recession of 1952-53) and the surge 
in oil production. Habituated to gradual changes, it could not apprehend the speed and scale of 
the revolution already in progress. “The most important is the urgent need to implement new 
works which would anticipate […] the needs of the traffic in the intermediate years between 
1960 to 1970. In this regard it would seem that the crucial moment would be 1965. One must 
face the fact that the eighth program was too mild as regards the pace of  the events which 
were unleashed a little after its launch. Its effects in 1959 were too modest and proved quite 
inadequate in face of the demands. It is therefore imperative that the ninth program be 
implemented at the earliest – from 1957, if possible.”
23 “The eighth program was charted out 
in 1954 based on the forecasts made in 1953. Very soon it became clear that these forecasts 
which were already quite impressive, would be far exceeded by the extraordinary growth in 
the oil demands. The Company also wanted to review them in order to set up a ninth program 
which would be implemented even before the completion of the eighth.”
24 
We can thus see the reasons for the delay (of some months) by the Company in evaluating and 
facing the revolution in maritime traffic in the middle of the 1950s. We do not think that this 
delay was caused by any mean financial considerations stemming from the awareness of the 
approaching end of the concession. The Company had in fact ample funds and could have 
                                                 
22 Note by Charles Ribeyre, an engineer of the Suez Company, 1955-1956, the Suez Company archives. 
23 Note by the engineer Charles Ribeyre, 1954-1955, the Suez Company archives. 
24 Note by Charles Ribeyre, 1959, the Suez Company archives. Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt the canal equipment to transit shipping ? 
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easily financed faster and more extensive work programs. It is true that after a gain of 9% in 
1950, the transit receipts stagnated for the next two years (-2% in 1951 and +2% in 1952), but 
they regained ground quickly with 8% in 1953, 5% in 1984 and 6% in 1955. In current francs, 
the receipts doubled from 1948 to 1955. Total receipts between 1947 and 1955 added up to 
2,348 million gold-francs (of 1913) – an average of 252 million annually – some 76% more 
than during the interwar period. The Company spent a total of 502 million francs in 
investments, amounting to half of what it had spent between 1859 and 1939 on long-term 
investments (non-maintenance) and more than the entire cost of the construction of the Canal. 
The total net profit between 1947 to 1955 came to 1,183 million francs, half the total turnover. 
Table 18. The main accounts of the Company in 1947-1955, in millions of gold-francs (of 1913) 
Total receipts  2 348 
Investments (apart from maintenance)  502 
Upgradation work  67 
Net profit  1 183 
Put in reserve  224 
Paid to Egypt (apart from taxes)  77 
Dividend to shareholders  815 





Seen from this angle, it is true that the shareholders did not get a dividend during the War (in 
fact till July 1947), but later they did very much get their part of the net profit (two thirds): 
“Ships leave golden wake of dividends [...]. It is one of the greatest parade of profit ever 
devised by man.”
25 Money was being continually put aside to face any unexpected managerial 
requirements and to have the reserves which would be needed to pay back the capital (to the 
tune of 90 million gold-francs in real value to be paid to the shareholders against a par value 
of 250 million francs
26) at the end of the concession in 1968. The amount of money spent on 
investment and maintenance (some 569 million francs) represented 24% of total revenues and 
48% of net profit. There is thus no room for talk about a “policy of neglect” which the 
Company was accused of by those who wanted to nationalize it. According to them, “The 
government has already taken note of the negligence of the public services companies when 
the end of their concession draws near. It was thus necessary that something be done in good 
time so as not to be saddled by a service in complete disarray. It was for these reasons that the 
Company was nationalized.”
 27 
                                                 
25 Life Magazine, 22 October 1951. 
26 In fact, a part of the capital (442 616 certificate of shares) had already been repaid to the shareholders through 
the means of the « capital amortization » begun in 1876. Only some 357 384 shares of 250 gold-francs remained 
to be paid back to the shareholders. 
27 Speech by the Egyptian Minister of Commerce, 27 July 1956, in Journal d’Égypte, 28 July 1956. Cf. also the 
critical work by Mostapha El-Hefnaoui, Les problèmes contemporains posés par le canal de Suez, Paris, 
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There is no evidence whatsoever that any of the directors of the Company tried to delay any 
work under the pretext of financial considerations
28. On the contrary, in June 1955, the board 
decided not to increase the dividend over the previous year, which meant that it was 
prioritizing further investment, without any thought towards any untoward financial gains. We 
are sure that the delay of the three to five quarters in dealing with the realities of the growth in 
the traffic can be explained by the inertia within the “organization” which the Company had 
become. It was thus a victim of a common defect in the functioning of any “enterprise” – 
making investments based on obsolete data which greatly misled the forecasting of the trend 
in the demand. 
One could well speculate on the growth and implementation of these work programs if 
nationalization had not intervened: the scope and pace of these programs would have been 
decided in the course of 1957, i.e., by 1958. It is only in terms of some months that the 
question of the Company’s “delay” regarding its scheme of modernization has been posed. 
There is no question of doubting any short-sightedness, ill will or archaism on its part. At the 
discharge (relative) of the Company, it would do well to remind ourselves that the years 1952-
1953 were marked by the mounting nationalist tensions in Egypt and that some of its directors 
were more concerned by keeping up good relations with the Egyptian government and 
calming the stormy social seas. This could very well have played its part in their being more 
concerned about the geopolitical destiny of the Canal than its technological one. 
On the other hand, if the investments had not been whittled down, we could have thought that 
the ship-owners had perhaps been sacrificed for the sake of the shareholders. The first hike 
took place between 1941 and 1947 (+39% compared to the level in December 1938) due to 
the inflation caused by the War and the after-War period and the necessity to finance the 
“restoration program”. The higher rate set in 1941 was maintained till September 1951. In 
spite of a few reductions, the “taxes” paid by the ship-owners were higher than those paid in 
1938-1950 and almost equal to those of 1935-1936. This left the ship-owners with precious 
little: in fact, over the years 1948 to 1955, they ended up paying an extra 42 million francs 
compared to what they would have paid had the tariffs been maintained at the 1935-36 level 
and a whopping 717 million francs more if the 1938-1939 level had been sustained. The 
Company could have used a part of the undistributed profit balance to take off some of the 
load from the heavy tariffs, but the link which had been established between an increase in the 
dividend and a reduction in the transit tariffs as a compensation had been severed in 1900. 
It seems that the ship-owners did not come together to put pressure on the Company for a 
reduction in the tariffs. It may be that the growth in maritime transport allowed them to pass 
on the extra cost to the shippers by hiking their own rates. It was only in September 1951, 
then later in June 1953 and in March 1954 that the Company agreed to lower its transit tariffs 
in accord with the demands of the British government and the ship-owners. Even then the 
changes were rather modest in comparison to the reductions which could have been easily 
possible in view of the revenues pouring in. All this in spite of the  ship-owners being well 
represented on the board of directors: there was Harrison Hughes (since 1919), alan Anderson 
(since 1927) and especially, William Currie (of the Peninsular & Oriental, since 1945) and 
Lord Rotherwick (of the Clan Line Steamers, since 1946). 
                                                 
28 Cf. Jacques Georges-Picot, Souvenirs d'une longue carrière. De la rue de Rivoli à la Compagnie de Suez 
(1920-1971), Paris, presented and annotated by Hubert Bonin & Nathalie Carré de Malberg, Paris, Committee 
for the economic and financial history of France, 1993. Did the Compagnie du canal de Suez assume its tasks to adapt the canal equipment to transit shipping ? 
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Table 20. Condition of the ship-owners using the Suez Canal with the rise in transit tariffs 
  Compared to the 
tariffs of July 
1935- July 1936 




Tariffs of September 1951 - July 1954  - 0.16 %  + 30.2 % 
Tariffs of July 1954 - July 1956  - 7 %  + 21.3 % 
Extra amount paid by ship-owners over the 
years 1947-1955 
42 million francs  717 million 
francs 
Table 21. Change in transit tariffs (in gold-francs of 1913)
29 
  On the ship’s 
cargo 
On its ballast 
1885 9.50  7 
1920 8.50  6 
1928 7  4.5 
1934 5.75  2.875 
1947 4.98  2.49 
1954 3.01  1.37 
 
Conclusion 
The history of  the “Suez  Maritime Canal Universal Company” could not escape the 
geopolitical upheavals of the period 1930 to 1950. In the eyes of some Egyptian intelligentsia, 
it symbolized European imperialism, simultaneously British and French and the massive 
protests of 27 July 1956 were an indication that they had won over a large section of the 
Egyptian population. The “Suez Affaire” with the conquest of the isthmus by British and 
French troops to stop the nationalization of the Canal by Nasser inflamed the smouldering 
nationalist emotions. And yet, we have shown that the Company had done well by its 
responsibilities and had assured the proper functioning of the Canal and other related services 
(repair of ships, navigation, human resource management, etc.). It had successfully kept 
abreast of the growth, both in quantity and quality, of the traffic passing through. Its judicious 
program of investments widened and deepened the Canal which allowed it to accommodate a 
greater number of larger and faster ships. Its engineers and financial directors had hit upon an 
optimal formula to determine with relative precision the investments required and thus avoid 
the pitfalls of under or over investing. 
Problems cropped up immediately after the Second World War when large ships – mainly the 
massive liners – found it very difficult to negotiate the Canal. The suspension of all 
investment for a half dozen years gave rise to the urgent need of a huge modernization 
program which resulted in a doubling of the waterway over almost half the length of the 
Canal. It was only in the middle of the 1950s that the Company was again shaken by the 
revolution in maritime traffic. Due mainly to the oil tankers, the number and size of the ships 
skyrocketed. There is no doubt that the implementation of a new work program to address the 
urgent need was delayed. The Company failed to be proactive and did not see the coming 
                                                 
29 Henri Poydenot, Le canal de Suez, Paris, collection Que sais-je ?, Presses universitaires de France, 1955, page 
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revolution in maritime traffic. Strategically, it thought that the changes taking place would 
more or less follow along routes already trod – that history would repeat itself. Its consequent 
investment policies were thus too meager and ineffective – only over the span of some months 
though – in spite of the fact that it had abundant financial resources. 
The history of business firms is full of such time lapses and institutional inflexibilities. In 
most cases they only knew how to apply strategic and tactical corrections – and the Suez 
Company did finally put together an investment program to meet the challenges. 
Paradoxically, it is not these shortcomings which have caused raised eyebrows, but rather the 
extreme reluctance to lower its transit tariffs. What would the history of maritime transport be 
like had these tariffs been regularly and sensibly reduced in keeping with the funds available? 
Retrospectively we have shown that the cost of the Canal and the work program for its 
modernization were easily recouped. The work by Lesseps paid for itself by the end of the 
19th century, the following work programs were autofinanced and the costs were recovered in 
quick time with the consequent increase in traffic and revenue. The amount of money put in 
reserve would have sufficed to face the end of the concession and pay back the capital – of 
which more than half had already been paid. The Canal thus became  a “business”, as the 
transit tariffs were not, according to us, reduced sufficiently.  
The key question is: why did the ship-owners tolerate such an “extortion”? Was it because the 
British ship-owners – who made up the majority of the Company’s clientele – had some 
pressure brought upon them by the Crown due to the fact that the British government, being a 
major shareholder of the Company, had large vested (financial) interests? We would need to 
have access to the English archives to uncover the sub rosa dealings between the British 
government and its ship-owners. It might also be interesting to evaluate the importance of the 
dividends pouring into the British coffers from the Suez Company. And finally, it would be 
interesting to see how a reduction in the transit tariffs would have caused an increase in the 
use of the Canal and in maritime traffic as a whole and, from a macro-economic viewpoint, 
resulted in a gain of how many percentage points in the global GNP… 
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